Electoral coalitions and legislative performance: Two disconnected games
Keywords:
Coalitions, electoral connection, Congress, party discipline, presidentAbstract
Do electoral coalitions have an effect on the behavior of legislators in the permanent committees of Congress? In this article I show that there is no statistically significant evidence that electoral commitments translate into individual legislative support for the public policy agenda proposed by president. Through an analysis of Argentinean ruling party deputies’ positions in committee, it is shown that support for executive projects is explained by institutional variables, such as partisan belonging or the electoral calendar, and by contextual variables, such as the presidential public opinion approval.
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Copyright (c) 2018 Paula Clerici
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